Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing - Askeladden Capital Q3 2018 Letter
Our Q3 2018 letter, overviewing five counterintuitive, mental-models driven lessons we've learned from five years of investing, is available below.
2018
-
10
-
24
–
Askeladden
Q3
’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
1
Dear Partners,
This month marks the fifth anniversary of my
professional investing career
: a little over two years as an
analyst at a hedge fund, and a little under three years running Askeladden.
An early mentor once pointed out the difference between fiv
e years’ experience and repeating one year’s
experience five times (i.e., making the same mistakes over and over again).
So I’ve always endeavored to
carefully reflect upon my experiences and distill their critical lessons.
Today, I’m happy to share fiv
e lessons I’ve learned over the past five years, told through the lens of mental
models.
To do that, we’ll need to start with
a fun story about toilet seats.
But first, a word on performance.
On the surface, not much has happened during Q3; as of 9/30, o
ur
performance was roughly in line with performance at the end of Q2.
Although I’m not doing my job right if the portfolio isn’t undervalued, I do believe that it was
particularly
undervalued as of 9/30; moreover, our watchlist has several candidates tha
t could absorb a meaningful
amount of capital were we to harvest gains from existing portfolio positions.
Notwithstanding general market valuations, our concentrated small/micro
-
cap approach continues to yield
attractive opportunities that I believe offe
r substantially above
-
average return with substantially below
-
average risk; I’m as optimistic about our prospects today as I have been since launch.
As such,
on
October 1st, I invested more money from my own
personal
cash reserves to increase my stake in
A
skeladden Capital Partners.
The investment is modest relative to my net worth
and existing stake in
Askeladden
, but material relative to my annual after
-
tax cash flow.
Month to date
in October
, our performance has declined meaningfully along with the broa
d market selloff
-
in our experience, very little analysis is being done during such market corrections, and all securities are
generally sold indiscriminately regardless of their fundamental characteristics.
We’ve taken the opportunity to deploy addition
al capital at what we believe are extremely attractive rates of
return, and are very close to fully invested. We’ve been through this
sort of volatility
about a half
-
dozen
times since launching Askeladden, and feel like we’ve managed it better and better
each time.
2018
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10
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–
Askeladden
Q3
’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
2
Starting this quarter, I’m separating portfolio commentary from the public investor letter to protect the
valuable proprietary research IP we spend our time
and resources
generating.
Clients have separately received
a 16
-
page overview of all ma
te
rial
portfolio positions
; I kindly ask that you not share that commentary.
Five Years of Professional Investing,
Five
Counterintuitive
Lessons
So much value investing content is
stale
: a cloned rehash of something someone else said.
I always try to no
t
do that, so that anyone who takes the time to read this letter comes away with something fresh and new.
I don’t claim that any of these five lessons are wholly original, but they’re not simply the n+1th debate over
the delineation of “growth vs. value,
” or tired platitudes about being fearful when others are greedy and vice
versa.
They’re all drawn from my experience and integrated with the relevant mental models; if I’d
understood them as well five years ago as I did today, I’d have a lot more dollars
, and a lot fewer white hairs.
Each lesson is self
-
contained, so feel free to pick and choose the lessons that sound most interesting to you.
Like all of the content on the
Poor Ash’s Almanack
, the best free mental models resource available
-
for which
praise has poured in from all corners of the world
-
hopefully these lessons will be as entertaining as
they are
educational.
Moreover, all of the lessons here are
very
practical
. A
s someone whose clients are entrusting me to make the
best decisions possible with their capital, I don’t have time for stuff that sounds fancy and intellectual but
doesn’t actually make me better at my job.
We’ll start, as promised, wit
h toilet seats.
Table of Contents
Pages 3
–
6:
Investing Lesson 1: Sandwiches, Toilet Seats, and Salmonella
Cognition vs. intuition + base rates.
Pages 7
–
9:
Investing Lesson 2
:
Begin With The End In Mind
Tradeof
fs + local vs. global optimizat
i
o
n
+ utilit
y.
Pages 10
–
13:
Investing Lesson 3: When’s A WIN A Loss?
Process vs. outcome + memory.
Page 14:
Investing Lesson
4:
The Width Of A Hair
Nonlinearity + hyperbolic discounting
Pages 15
–
17:
Investing Lesson 5: All In Ain’t Alright
Mindfulness + stress + i
ncentives
Page 17: Conclusions
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Askeladden
Q3
’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
3
Investing Lesson 1: Sandwiches, Toilet Seats, and Salmonella.
(Pages 3
-
6)
Mental models:
cognition vs. intuition
,
Bayesian reasoning / priors
,
base rates
,
probabilistic thinking
He
y: you ever make sandwiches, or know anyone who does?
Well, if you do, here’s a tip for ya: if you want your next PB&J
without
a side of salmonella, science says it’s
probably safer to make it on the toilet s
eat than on your cutting board.
1
2
That’s a pi
ece of advice most people wouldn’t just find unconscionable: they’d find it downright
revolting.
It
goes against all common sense.
Science and our stomach aside, there’s the social
-
perception angle.
Can you imagine chiding your mother
-
in
-
law for engagi
ng in the statistically dangerous food
-
safety practice of making your kid’s sandwich on the
counter?
“Granny, come on now.
You
know
you’re supposed to be doing that on the commode.
Be a good role model for little
Johnny.”
Just imagine what the health
inspector would say if she discovered the local deli employees carefully crafting
footlongs in the men’s room.
When it comes to germs, we sometimes wildly obsess about non
-
issues and blithely ignore really big
ones.
Why? Our intuitions are untrained. M
ost of us without a degree in microbiology have, at best, only
the vaguest of understandings of how germs survive and multiply.
So actions that would strike most of us as risky can actually turn out to be surprisingly harmless.
My favorite
example: you’d
think that an easy way to get sick would be vigorously making out, for several minutes, with
someone of your preferred gender who has a severe case of the common cold.
Turns out, it’s actually really
hard to
catch the common cold this way.
3
Conversely, ac
tions that might seem totally innocuous to a casual observer
-
for example, dropping a few
cloves of raw garlic into a bottle of olive oil
, or leaving a foil
-
wrapped baked potato out on the counter
-
can
turn out to be
exceptionally
dangerous, and even fat
al.
4
Hooks, Riptides, and Due Diligence
Let’s bring this discussion of intuition back to investing.
A common aphorism is that the great ideas jump
out at you
-
Warren Buffett does his modeling on the back of a napkin, any good investment idea can be
wri
tten on a sticky note, yada yada yada.
1
2016 “Today” arti
cle citing University of Arizona microbiology professor Dr. Charles Gerba.
https://www.today.com/health/your
-
kitchen
-
dirtier
-
toilet
-
seat
-
869333
Admittedly, I’m taking
some artistic license here; his discussion assumes that people
cut raw meat
on cutting boards and then just
casually rinse them before reusing for other purposes.
I’m not sure anyone actually does this; personally, I sanitize anything raw meat has come in
to
contact with by pouring boiling water all over it (sometimes multiple times).
Still,
directionally
, the point holds, and he goes on to discuss how germ
-
laden most people’s sponges and dishcloths are and how that can contaminate many countertops
-
but i
t’s harder to make a metaphor about dishcloths
than it is about toilet seats.
2
If you’re ever invited over for dinner, please be aware that notwithstanding my newfound knowledge of this
base rate
, I still stick to the
conventional approach of preparing f
ood on the kitchen counter rather than the toilet seat.
Diner beware...
3
This lovely tidbit is courtesy of Jennifer Ackerman’s “
Ah
-
Choo
.” The best part: some review board actually
sanctioned
a study that paid volun
teers to
make out with rhinovirus
-
y strangers.
Somewhere, Shawn Achor is wondering what he has to do to get a charades study approved...
4
https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/a70a5447
-
9490
-
4855
-
af0d
-
e617ea6b5e46/Clostridium_botulinum.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
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Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
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This is often surprisingly true: despite the fact that I typically create research documents that often range
from 10 to 50+ pages in length on an initial pass, most of that work is due diligence
-
a series of check
s,
whether quantitative or qualitative, on the validity of an initial “hook” into an idea.
It’s certainly not uncommon for a “hook” to turn into nothing
-
some ideas that seem intriguing turn out to
have flaws once you dig deeper, which is why it’s impor
tant to do the work.
But I find the converse to be
true far less often: rarely do I start profoundly uninterested in something, and after days or weeks of
painstaking work, find some magic detail that all of a suddenly seals the deal.
This “know it when y
ou see it” hook recognition is a common pattern I’ve heard from talking to managers
with far more experience than me.
And it’s a bit perplexing, because it contradicts my early experiences as an
individual investor: I’d get excited about ideas on the basi
s of very little information... and, predictably,
they’d turn out to not work out nearly as well as I thought they might.
What’s changed?
Well, to return to the section heading, Kip Tindell had it right when he made The
Container Store’s fifth Foundation Pr
inciple about the mental model of
cognition vs. intuition:
“Intuition
does not come to an unprepared mind.
You have to train before it happens.”
(More discussion is available in Tindell’s
Uncontainable
-
UCT review + notes
).
It is now generally well
-
known and accepted that
“we think much less than we think we think”
-
or, in other words,
much more of our decis
ion
-
making is driven by automatic heuristics than by careful, procedural reasoning.
But most of the discussion about data vs. judgment (or, framed differently, cognition vs. intuition) misses the
critical insight that judgment
with
data works better than
either without the other.
Nate Silver discusses this
point through the lens of meteorology and other fields in
“
The Signal and the Noise
”
(
SigN review + notes
); Dr.
Jerome Groopman does the same thing for medical diagnoses in
“
How Doctors Think
”
(
HDT review + notes
).
Our brains are capable of performing amazingly complex distillations incredibly quickly when they’re trained
to do so: think of fighter pilots.
Or, in a more pedestrian everyday sense, fo
r Americans, the automatic ease
with which we translate degrees Fahrenheit and wind/rain forecast into a weather
-
appropriate outfit.
Practice
crystallizes cognition into intuition, freeing up cognition for higher
-
level tasks. In fact, overthinking in
cri
tical, time
-
sensitive situations can often lead to disaster.
Cognition is simply too slow.
However, importantly: trained intuition only applies in the circumstances in which it was trained for.
When
removed from those circumstances, it’s useless or worse
. Laurence Gonzales drives this home in
“
Deep
Survival
”
(
DpSv review + notes
), discussing how unprepare
d we are to emotionally understand the magnitude
of forces involved in riptides or avalanches.
Yet we have a tendency to
overgeneralize
the applicability of our trained intuition
-
we like to think, in other
words, that being good at one thing makes us g
ood at everything, as if being a talented investor / lawyer /
business manager somehow makes us better
-
equipped to calm down a screaming three
-
year old, change the
oil in our car, or make mayonnaise from scratch.
(Nobody actually believes those examples,
but we
nonetheless act as if it’s true in many important domains of our life).
So, someone who’s spent a lot of time analyzing niche industrials and professional services companies (like
me) will probably have pretty accurate and useful intuitions about
the investment prospects of the n + 1th
industrials/professional services company based on a quick review of the situation.
But here’s the kicker: all of that time spent studying business fundamentals has given me absolutely
no
useful
training in interpr
eting recent stock
-
price movements and predicting their future directions.
In fact, based on
my understanding of neuroscience and economics, there’s a strong case to be made that our intuition
cannot
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’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
5
be trained for such tasks, as there are simply too many
variables and too much reflexivity to be able to
identify and recognize consistent patterns.
Nonetheless, I spent many years implicitly trying to do so, following the classic value investor sensibility of
not buying stocks that have run up, and eagerly bu
ying stocks that have pulled back.
Over time, I’ve realized
this sort of reflexive reliance on intuition
-
“it’s more likely to be a bargain if it’s pulled back,”
or
“it’s not likely to be a
bargain if it’s run up”
-
has little to no basis in reality.
T
o put it somewhat more formally: five years of professional experience has provided a lot of training in
accurately determining intrinsic value of certain kinds of stocks; I spend much of my life thinking about and
doing this,
and
I have gotten better at i
t over time, and have a high rate of success in doing so.
Conversely, all that time spent on fundamental investment work has not provided any useful training in
assessing a stock’s recent price action
-
the
base rate
of me predicting a stock’s near
-
term movements, or its
responses to “catalysts” like earnings reports, is woeful.
I would, in fact, argue that it is probably impossible
for most people to assess such
things profitably most of the time (a topic I will discuss more in an upcoming
memo... bombshell: Howard Marks, who I’ve long been a great fan of, gets it critically wrong in his new
book.)
Again looking at
base rates
, or statistical tendencies: although I
haven’t run an analysis on every purchase
I’ve made, I can say that some of my most profitable purchases have been stocks that have run up,
sometimes meaningfully
-
and some of my worst decisions have been when deep short to medium term price
declines have
activated my bargain
-
hunting sensibilities (see
product vs. packaging
, or Thaler’s excellent
discussion of
transaction utility in
“
Misbehaving
”
(
M review + notes
)
).
This isn’t to say I’ve become
a momentum chaser (far from it).
I’ve just recognized that I have no rational
basis on which to assess the relationship between recent and future price action; as such, it’s no longer an
input in my investing process.
Mental Models Applied To Portfolio M
anagement
Most investors are familiar with the concept of “circle of competence,” but don’t understand the underlying
mental models thoroughly enough to apply it consistently
-
resulting in implicit or explicit utilization of non
-
trained intuition, which,
as we have discussed, is inferior to cognition.
The most well
-
known example: managers with strong bottom
-
up stock
-
picking capabilities becoming overly
influenced by their own (untrained, usually untrainable, and thus unhelpful) intuition on macroeconomic
forecasting.
I’m careful not to go down that road.
My approach to staying within the limits of trained intuition
-
while still
finding opportunities to train intuition
-
manifests itself in Askeladden’s process in several ways:
A.
It starts with keeping my
eyes open
and being receptive to the lessons the world offers to teach
me.
Intuition can be trained; it just takes time and effort. (
Five years of experience vs. one year of experience five
times.)
B.
A concept I call “familiarity risk”
(an interaction betw
een cognition/intuition and
trait
adaptivity
.)
When writing research documents and updates, I take the approach of always not only assessing
the merits of an idea, but
my own
ability to handle it
.
What’s my historical experience with this company
-
and
broader categories which this situation would fit into, whether that’s dimensionalized by sector, business
model, or type of investment setup?
That’s an input into how aggre
ssively I can underwrite a valuation or size a position, or how long I choose to
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’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
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watch and learn before becoming involved (if ever).
The lower the familiarity, the higher the risk, and the
more cautious I need to be. The truth is that there are many grea
t ideas other people have that I would never
be able to handle
-
and there are many great ideas I have that other people would never be able to handle.
I have a reputation for being a highly concentrated investor, which is something I’m willing to do, but
there’s
a difference between being
concentrated
and being
stupid.
I’ll take big positions when there’s an overlap
between a great idea and a great ability to handle it on my part, but I routinely take 100
-
300 bps starter
positions, too
-
and, not uncom
monly, they never get bigger than that for a variety of reasons.
It’s all a
function of the risk factors on
both sides of the table.
C.
Constant self
-
reflection on research techniques
-
setting aside
companies
, what’s working in my process
and what’s not?
W
hat are things I do that consistently fail to add value?
What are the things that add value
consistently and how can I do more of them?
What are things I
could’ve
done that
would’ve
added value, but
didn’t?
(I’ve previously discussed this last one in
the context of “management premiums” for really good
management teams
-
I used to never assign them because I wasn’t confident in my ability to assess
management teams, but as I’ve been able to train my intuition in this area, I’m more confident in letting
this
influence decisions modestly.)
Moreover: look around.
What are the things other people do that add value and how can I emulate
those?
I’ve enjoyed discussing and collaborating
-
at various levels of depth
-
with investors with profoundly
differe
nt approaches from mine.
This includes a deep
-
value manager (we’re very focused on business quality), a manager who uses extensive
primary research (we rarely do so), and, of course, the research documentation process we shamelessly stole
from our frien
d and mentor Zeke Ashton at Centaur Capital.
All of this may sound elementary.
It’s easier said than done. This isn’t about a simplistic, binary, black
-
and
-
white “I only invest in XYZ sector or ABC kind of company.”
It’s about assessing
-
with regards t
o
everything from
research techniques
to
trading decisions
-
whether I have any reason to believe that my intuition
will be helpful.
If it is, I’ll make active decisions based on that intuition. If not, I’ll try my best to stick to
whatever
base rate
is
applicable, maximizing my statistical chance of success.
Takeaway:
trained intuition is superior to cognition, which is superior to untrained intuition. It’s important
to differentiate which is which
-
and to actively work on training intuition.
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Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
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Investin
g Lesson 2: Begin With The End In Mind
(Pages 7
–
9)
Mental models:
utility
,
nonlinearity
,
path
-
dependency
,
opportunity costs
,
n
-
order impacts
,
humans vs. econs
,
local vs. global
optimization
,
bottlenecks
One of the most amusing assumptions of classical econom
ics is that we’re capable of “optimizing” our
decisions: that is to say, that we evaluate the benefits and costs of any given decision, and compare them
against our (of course infinite) knowledge of opportunity costs of
other
possible decisions which this
one
precludes, and then we further have the (again of course infinite) willpower to make and stick to the right
decision all the time.
Sound unrealistic?
Yeah
-
the founders of behavioral economics thought so too.
As Richard Thaler relays in
“
Misbehaving
”
(
M review + notes
)
, Amos Tversky once asked an economist:
“Y
ou seem to think that virt
ually everyone you know is incapable of correctly making even the simplest of economic
decisions, but then you assume that all the agents in your models are geniuses.
What gives?”
Suffice to say that we’re not naturally prone to evaluating the universal c
onsequences of our decisions.
There
are a number of counterintuitive mental models
-
n
-
order impacts
,
feedback
,
complexity
, and so on
-
that
make doing so difficult.
At the simplest level, however, people often fail to utilize a
local vs. global optimization
paradigm when
making mental models, thus unwittingly trading off long
-
term opportunities for what seems like a good idea
in the short term.
One of the best metaphors for how to avoid this kind of thinkin
g is the Stephen Covey
maxim to “begin with the end in mind.”
It’s one of the core habits in
“
The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People
”
(
7H review + notes
), and Covey illustrates
it vividly by asking readers to think about what they’d want said at their eulogy.
It has a way of putting
current frustrations and desires into perspective.
Let’s translate this theory into practical investment ramifications: one of the most important lessons I’ve
internalized as a professional investor is that
my goal is not to maximize theoretically achievable returns
-
that is to say,
returns that could id
eally be achieved in some fantasy land.
Instead,
my goal is to maximize practically achievable returns
-
what I can
actually
manage
in the
real world.
What’s the difference?
Allow me to explain.
Every decision made as a professional investor
-
ranging fro
m firm structure to investment approach
-
has
far
-
ranging impacts that often aren’t considered initially.
Here are some examples of the sorts of tradeoffs
I’ve observed in the industry.
Large firms have more resources than small ones
-
but also need to sp
end far more time on
compliance, operations, and client management.
PMs at larger shops routinely report having far less
time for research than at smaller shops. Additionally, the larger the shop, the fewer opportunities are
s
izable enough to be worthwhi
le.
For small shops, adding a few resources can provide a meaningful increase in man
-
hours to manage
research and operations.
However, there are also added inefficiencies related to training,
communication, and required HR work (tax forms, health benefits
, and so on).
Moreover, many
instances of process failure are related to people issues. Investors who don’t anticipate these issues,
and aren’t adequately prepared to manage through them, often end up
with the worst of both worlds.
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Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
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More diversified portf
olios can reduce risks related to being wrong on any individual idea.
At the
same time, they suck up far more time in terms of monitoring and trading existing positions, often
leaving the investor with less time to conduct
de novo
research to identify new
pro
spective investment
candidates.
Similarly, investment approaches focused on extensive primary research, “channel checks,” and so on
can conceivably provide incremental insight, but also dramatically restrict the number of names that
can be follow
ed an
d diligenced at any level
–
it’s a question of the
marginal utility
of information.
The same applies to approaches which attempt to predict near
-
term events (whether corporate
actions or earnings reports).
While potential incremental returns might be gained in the short
-
term,
the tradeoff is that all time spent becomes completely worthle
ss once the event or report
materializes, vis
-
a
-
vis more long
-
term approaches where research today can have a much longer
-
term
payoff spanning days or years.
Any form of added “complexity” beyond plain vanilla, unlevered, long
-
only stockpicking
-
that is
to
say, short
-
selling, the use of options, the use of margin, or the use of complex derivatives
-
adds
meaningful operational burden.
Although the use of such instruments can add return, it also
-
as
with the above three items
-
reduces the time and menta
l energy an investor has to hunt down new
ideas.
None of these are particularly brilliant insights; they are all relatively mundane.
Yet despite the fact that
they’re fairly obvious, I’ve seen much of the industry operate as if this was not the case
-
as
if these tradeoffs
can be hand
-
waved away.
Indeed, thinking about the longer
-
term consequence of actions, and how they’ll affect other parts of
investing, allows investors to make more appropriate decisions.
For example:
Many investors often make the mist
ake of relying too heavily on other investors’ judgment
-
at the
extreme, utilizing “cloning” or “guru” approaches where the investment decisions of “great”
investors is used as a starting point.
While this could make sense from a
base rates
perspective,
there are a number of
execution/practical
disadvantages.
Primarily: when you don’t fully understand
an investment thesis
yourself
, it is extremely difficult to
evaluate and manage the position over time, as
you won’t know how to interpret or re
act to incremental data points.
Many investors fall down the rabbit hole of being seduced by “big ideas” that have substantially more
variables/inputs
-
and thus are subst
antially less predictable
-
than bottom
-
up analysis of individual
companies.
In trying to incorporate these new worldviews, investors vastly overestimate the payoff
and vastly underestimate the risk of interference with existing process.
For someone who i
s extremely interested in learning and improving, I’m also
extremely picky
about areas where
I want to learn and improve.
It has to fit into my existing structure and process, which is highly informed by
“starting with the end in mind.”
For example, from
a business structure perspective:
I’m closing to new clients at $50MM in FPAUM to preserve a long runway for continuing to
compound client capital without exhausting our small and micro
-
cap opportunity set.
I’ve heard
from numerous investors the challeng
e of rapidly scaling to, say, $200
-
$300MM, then realizing that
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Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
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an investment strategy that excelled with a mid
-
8
-
figure asset base doesn’t work quite so well with a
mid
-
9
-
figure asset base.
While determining the exact capacity of any strategy is more
art than science, closing early and
compounding our way toward whatever that capacity ends up being provides us with much more
ability to identify
-
and adjust to
-
any variety of problems that might crop u
p at scale.
I’m always planning to remain a one
-
m
an shop, to avoid the “worst of both worlds” issue of being a
small team
-
there’s as much management / communication / HR work as would be required for a
larger team, but there’s insufficient resources to outsource or delegate those issues to someone
else
.
People management is a very different skillset from investing
-
not one I’ve developed, nor one
I want to develop while
trying to be a great investor.
I shun investing approaches that would add operational complexity and the consequent burden of
invest
ed time and emotional energy.
It also shows up from an investing perspective:
The “watchlist” approach we utilize enables us to develop a differentiated longitudinal view of
companies, allowing us to be more nuanced and objective in our underwriting, groun
ded in a
historical perspective rather than overly focused on recent data points and trends.
Our research documentation process not only allows us to immediately retrieve due diligence on any
individual company, but also allows us to identify cross
-
situat
ional insights that apply far a
field from
where we found them.
Our general avoidance of businesses with risk factors we wouldn’t kn
ow how to manage or evaluate,
such as excessive leverage or commodity exposure, prevents us from ending up trapped in situat
ions
we can’t handle appropriately.
Our intentional avoidance of any sort of non
-
obvious macro view (i.e., something not based on very
long
-
term, very obvious
base rates
) prevents our trained
-
intuition bottom
-
up underwriting of
individual stocks from bein
g confused
by irrelevant exogenous noise.
Our strong preference for relying solely on our own analysis
-
i.e., using others’ work to provide
context and perspective, but never make the decision for us
-
ensures that we’re not caught in limbo
if things don
’t go the way we expect, because we know what we’re looking for and how we’ll respond
if it doesn’t materialize.
Takeaway:
think about long
-
term consequences and the tradeoffs engendered in making a decision.
2018
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Q3
’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
10
Investing Lesson 3: When’s A WIN A Loss?
(Pag
es 10
–
13)
Mental models:
memory
,
process vs. outcome
“Writ
ing is a powerful technology.
Why not use it?
”
-
Don Norman in “
The Design of Everyday Things
” (
DOET review + notes
)
Of all the mundane things that can wreck a process, it turns out that plain old
memory
is one of them.
Richard
Thaler has a fun anecdote about hindsight bias in his wonderful book
“
Misbehaving
”
(
M review + notes
)
,
translating the classic “principal
-
agent” problem into a real world counterpart: the “dumb principal” problem.
Essentially, once an outcome is known, it is
a natural cognitive phenomenon to assume that the outcome was
always destined
-
this is called “creeping determinism.”
But the truth is that we don’t have a crystal ball, and
we have to make the best decisions we can based on information available at the
time. What’s more, in
future, we have to
evaluate
those decisions on the same playing field, rather than simply pointing to a good or
bad outcome as proof of a good or bad decision.
Oftentimes, it’s not that simple.
To illustrate this point, let’s turn
to an anecdote.
A friend and I were sitting in his car after a charity lunch
earlier this year, talking about stocks
-
as we like to do.
(He’s not an investor by profession, but very
interested in mental models and the like.)
“I see Dave and Buster’s (
PLAY) popped after earnings,”
said my
friend.
“
Great call
-
you were just talking about how that one seemed undervalued!”
I shrugged.
“
I have no clue why the stock’s up so much.
It was one quarter.
The
numbers weren’t even that good
-
comps were
still
down 5%.
Guidance is unchanged
. I have no idea what people are so excited about. It’s not enough data to ascertain
whether or not their business is back on solid footing.
As far as I’m concerned, literally nothing fundamentally has changed.”
I didn’t a
ctually own PLAY for that pop, but there have been many similar situations I could point to where I
did.
For example, in late February 2018, we purchased a small position in Dallas
-
based enterprise software
company Zix (ZIXI) at a cost basis around $3.95.
We had followed the company for about eighteen months,
and had always liked the business and the management team.
Over that time period, the valuation had never aligned with a
price we were willing to pay
.
5
However, Zix
began experiencing some challenge
s that depressed its near
-
term outlook. We viewed these challenges as
transitory, while the market appeared to be pricing them as structural
-
so based on our previous diligence
and our interpretation of the company’s then
-
current results, we took a low
-
s
ingle digit position.
After an in
-
person meeting with the company’s CEO to discuss the challenges
-
and the company’s planned
response
-
we were optimistic about the company’s prospects, and wanted to build our position further to,
say, mid
-
single digits.
Alas, it seems that others saw the same opportunity that we did, and by the time we
were ready to buy more, the stock had already rallied meaningfully.
5
One of the reasons for this: Zix held a large balance of “deferred tax assets,” which, for those not an expert in obscur
e balance
-
sheet items,
essentially means they were able to use long
-
ago losses to offset future profits for tax purposes. As such, they’ve been paying low to no cash taxes for
a while, and will continue to do so for a while.
A while, however, is not “for
ever”
–
they have a finite amount of past losses available to offset future taxes. Unfortunately, a number of investors do
very sloppy valuation work, and many who followed / purchased ZIXI took the conceptually indefensible approach of simply valu
ing ZIX
I at a
multiple to current free cash flow. The problem is that the company’s current free cash flow is benefited by the finite defe
rred tax asset.
I’m well known for barely modeling, but even I have standards that exceed this sort of
gross
incompetence
in financial analysis
: you have to separate
the (finite) value of the deferred tax asset from the (ongoing, underlying) free cash flow the company would earn on a fully
-
taxed basis. Under
previous tax rates, ZIXI would’ve been a quite high tax payer with
out the DTA, as its business is substantially all domestic U.S. income.
The tax reform bill helped us here, as it lowered the benefit from the DTA and thus made it a less analytically relevant issu
e.
2018
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Askeladden
Q3
’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
11
The rally never let up, and merely a month and a half later, we found ourselves trimming the position o
n price
strength
-
and by early May, merely two months and a week or so after our initial purchase, we had
completely sold out of ZIXI at a weighted average price of ~$4.89, which represented a slight premium to
our fair value estimate on the stock at the
time.
That’s good for a ~23% return on capital deployed, and a
fantastic IRR (which I’m too lazy to calculate.)
But was our investment in ZIXI a success?
In our minds, that’s still an open question.
Consider this:
between our initial investment and our
last sale, the company
did not release a single data point.
The company’s
first earnings report subsequent to our initial purchase actually occurred
after
we made our last sale.
The
stock’s rally was not due to any “new news”
-
it was simply due to the m
arket reinterpreting available
information.
Admittedly, short
-
term financial results don’t offer a ton of value (see the PLAY example above), but they at
least offer
something
that short term stock prices don’t: if I expect a company to have sales that a
re more or
less flat, and they’re up or down a few percent, that probably doesn’t mean much.
But if the company’s sales
are down double digits, well, that maybe means something.
Since our sale, ZIXI has reported three times, and all three reports corrobor
ate our initial thesis
-
which is
good.
Nonetheless, it’s still not proven, in our minds, that our assessment of Zix was valid. It certainly
appears that there is a quite high probability that the company’s challenges were merely transitory and they
are
on strong footing going forward... but we don’t know yet.
Why am I making so much out of what amounts to a small win in the portfolio?
The answer is because
sometimes, a WIN’s a loss.
In a recent conversation with a large endowment that was vetting Askeladd
en as a prospective investment, I
stressed how important I think it is to focus on evaluating my results by
process
, not outcome.
Very
reductionistically, here is how any value investing process works
at a high level
:
1.
The investor comes up with some view
on the future of the business.
2.
The investor comes up with some valuation that they deem appropriate, relative to that view
on the
future of the business.
3.
Given enough time, if
the assessment in (1)
is correct, th
e market will come to reflect the valuation
in
(2),
and the investor will earn a profit.
There are essentially three
potential p
oints of failure here, of which I view only one as analytically relevant for
my purposes.
In reverse order,
starting with (3):
the business could do really well but the ma
rket could
perpetually fail to recognize its appropriate value.
This is usually not a meaningful risk because the company
can take actions (such as selling itself
to a financial or strategic buyer
, repurchasing stock, paying out
dividends, etc) that will
return value created to shareholders.
Similarly, I don’t view
item (2)
as a risk
-
a failure here would essentially mean that I was too aggressive in my
valuation,
given a certain set of fundamentals.
If anything, you could probably fault me for being
too
conservative
in
my valuation
approach
.
There may be occasional exceptions, but by and large, I think that I tend to
underwrite things much more conservatively than the average investor, and as such this isn’t really a realistic
avenue for process failure
.
That leaves only one point where we can realistically have a bad outcome: if future results differ materially
from those that we underwrite.
To put it another way, as long as we
-
on average and in the aggregate
-
correctly underwrite future results, we
will earn our targeted investment
hurdle rate (typically 20% annually
).
2018
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10
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Askeladden
Q3
’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
12
So it logically follows that most of our focus should be on calibrating our process of underwriting future
results.
If we do this correctly, we will earn superior returns over time.
If we fail to do this correctly, we may
be bailed out by luck once in a while
-
but, on average and in the aggregate, our performance will fail to live
up to the standards we view as acceptable.
Going back to ZIXI, then, we got a good outcome on the stock
price.
I’m not complaining. But there was,
at the time we sold, no rational basis on which to conclude that our underwriting was successful or
not.
There was no incremental data to corroborate the notion that ZIXI was on solid footing.
And, interesting
ly, the biggest ‘mistake” I think I’ve made in the eleven quarters since Askeladden’s inception
is not one that will show up as a loss
on the P&L
.
In fact, it shows up as a big WIN.
Trade records show
that Askeladden Capital Partners purchased shares of
mostly
-
rural hardline telecom company Windstream
(WIN) at a weighted average cost basis of $28.75 per share in January 2016.
We sold ~60% of
the position in
April 2016 at
~$38.89
-
a 35% gain relative to cost basis
-
and sold the remainder of the position
in
September 201
6 for $41.30 per share
-
a ~43
% gain relative to cost basis.
6
Clearly, on an annualized basis, that’s a pretty good return on capital... so what’s the problem?
Well, the
problem is that:
A.
I had no clue what I was doing,
B.
My thesis tu
rned out
to be entirely wrong,
C.
The profits we earned on the stock were pure luck and entirely undeserved.
If you pull up a stock
chart
of Windstream today, you’ll see that it trades for around $4.90
-
a decline of
nearly 90% since we sold our last shares, and still
a decline of over 80% vis
-
a
-
vis our weighted average cost
basis.
(Hey look, it’s a real
-
life example of the old saw: a stock that’s down 90% is a stock that was once
down 80%, then fell by 50% more!)
I am not close to the Windstream situation, but it doe
sn’t take much work to gather that all the core tenets of
my thesis were wrong.
Essentially, the bull thesis on Windstream
-
the fundamental results we underwrote
-
was that the company was trading very cheaply relative to its operating cash flow; much of
that cash flow was
being reinvested into growth projects to improve the company’s network and competitive positioning, but
what was left still amounted to a huge dividend, and management planned to use future cash flow to
accretively repurchase shares and
retire debt.
Although the company’s business was challenged, it wasn’t
imploding (on the whole
-
there were some good segments, some bad segments).
Summarily, it all went downhill since then: the good segments turned out to be not
-
very
-
good, the bad
segm
ents turned out to be awful, and the “growth” capex turned out to be maintenance capex.
Now, of
course, a lot of other things have happened
-
a long period of worsening financials, an acquisition, a lawsuit
regarding the propriety of the CSAL/Uniti transa
ction, etc
-
and I’m not suggesting that investors should
“pro forma” our results as if we’d bought Windstream and held it until the current date.
Windstream could
be a great buy here
-
or it could go bankrupt. I don’t know. That’s not the point.
The po
int is that even though Windstream shows up on our audited financials as a win, it sticks out in my
mind as a major process failure.
We deserved to lose money on Windstream. The only reason we didn’t was
6
Note that Windstream
subsequently
conducted a 1
-
for
-
5
reverse stock split, so we have multiplied the actual cost basis per share in trade records by 5
to maintain comparability.
2018
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10
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24
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Askeladden
Q3
’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
13
luck. If I invested in a hundred Windstreams over
the next 10 years, luck would only save us on a few of
them.
The rest of them would result in permanent loss of capital.
Admittedly it was never a large position, and we managed to luck out from a moment of market optimism,
but: looking back, problems ab
ounded.
I knew very little about the space (see “familiarity risk” earlier), and if
I’d had a wider/deeper understanding of telecom, I would likely have been more focused on the
base rate
of
hardline telecom companies being businesses which dig holes in t
he ground, throw all their operating cash
flow into them, and pray that t
he cash comes back out someday.
7
Indeed, Windstream was, in some ways, the last dying gasp of my old, pre
-
Askeladden deep
-
value
-
ish
approach: today, a business like Windstream (that w
as optically
extraordinarily
cheap) would never make it past
even our initial quality hurdles. Even setting that aside, it had a very high degree of leverage, which as I have
discussed elsewhere, can do brutal things to even what seems like very large/wide
margins of safety.
It was
an industry we were not at all familiar with, suggesting the position should have been smaller and
accumulated slowly over time as we saw more corrobo
rating data points (see
discussion of familiarity risk).
Meanwhile, other pr
ocess failures don’t show up on the scorecard at all.
I referenced our valuation
conservatism earlier; as a result of this, it’s often the case that stocks we think aren’t cheap enough go on to
do really well
-
or stocks that we sell because they meet our
fai
r value go on to have
further upside.
I’m often asked about some of these, and, again, my response is very focused on
process
rather than
outcome
.
For example, Korn Ferry (KFY) has posted very strong results since we sold it for a nice gain, and at
on
e point, the stock price had more than doubled from our highest sale price thereof.
That said, in reviewing
the results since then, I don’t really believe that they were
ex ante
predictable
-
put more simply, the company
has vastly outperformed my expecta
tions, along with those of everyone else in the market, but I think things
could have worked out another way.
Perhaps I was a little too conservative on KFY, but it’s not one I lose a
lot of sleep over.
Conversely, I’ve previously talked about my extreme
regrets regarding our lack of participation in the upside
at DMC Global (BOOM)
-
formerly known as Dynamic Materials.
These were situations that
were
predictable, and my failure to successfully invest in them was simply a result of
status quo bias
-
I anchored
too much on my initial valuation, failing to re
-
underwrite the situation as business results inflected positively
and dat
a began to arrive demonstrating that their line of intrinsically
-
safe, factory
-
assembled DynaSelect and
DynaStage products were gaining massive market share in the oilfield.
I avoided this mistake aga
in, purchasing DMC Global
in early 2018 at a price tha
t was in the neighborhood of
>2x what we’d sold it at previously, and ~4x what we’d paid for it initially.
Was that a bitter pill to swallow?
Yes
-
but with the correct
framing
, I was able to avoid
sunk
-
cost
thinking.
It wasn’t important what I’d
bought or
sold it at before.
What
was
important is what I thought it was worth, and what it was trading for
now.
Our investment in DMC Global, albeit small in absolute size, proved very profitable in 2018.
In any event, returning to Richard Thaler’s fun story abo
ut dumb principals: one of the things we’ve learned
is that to accurately calibrate decision
-
making, we need an accurate record of decisions made and the
information they were based on.
We’ve previously discussed the massive benefit of our thorough resear
ch
documentation approach on productivity in terms of not losing previous work and being able to quickly make
appropriate investment decisions (i.e. much of the legwork is completed long
before
we choose to invest), but
an additional, equally important ben
efit is the vast trove of data we can use to calibrate our process and train
our intuition.
7
Forgive the oversimplification.
I’m sure there are other telecom companies out there that are better.
But, as best I can tell
from the very limited
follow
-
up work I’ve done, it’s not the sort of sector Askeladden is well
-
equipped to analyze or invest in.
2018
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10
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24
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Askeladden
Q3
’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
14
Investing Lesson 4: The Width Of A Hair
(Page 14)
Mental models:
nonlinearity
,
hyperbolic discounting
“When you’re star
ting a company, it never goes at the pace you want or expect... you start, you build it, and you think
everyone’s going to care.
But no one cares. Not even your friends.”
-
Nate Chesky, cofounder of AirBnB
That quote, from Brad Stone’s “
The Upstarts
” (
TUS
review + notes
), epitomizes the analytical challenges
discussed by Geoffrey West in “
Scale
” (
SCALE review + notes
).
We’re linear approximators living in a
profoundly nonlinear world. Just like the world looks flat up close but is actually round, many of
the
phenomena we observe are linear enough over our (very short, ADD) attention span, but are profoundly
nonlinear
over any large enough scale.
I know, I know
-
“compounding” is the eighth wonder of the world, there’s even an apocryphal Einstein
quote about it or whatever, and it’s hardly new news to investors.
But one of the interesting thi
ngs about
nonlinearity is that no matter how much you
think
you think nonlinearly, nonlinearity can always be
profoundly surprising when it pops up.
Part of this is because of
hyperbolic discounting
-
our tendency to
vastly overemphasize the importance of the present.
Statistical realities about long
-
term consequences
(atherosclerosis is bad, mmkay?) fall flat in the face of
short
-
term desires (steak is tasty.)
Here are a few examples, in no particular order.
I’ve often heard
-
from other investors, and even from the long
-
tenured IR representative of a
billion
-
dollar company
-
that “bad sentiment” on an industry is here to st
ay, for a really long
time.
I’ve often looked up merely months later to find that sentiment gone
-
or completely reversed.
Cue the classic saw about making traders broke by gi
ving them tomorrow’s headlines.
“Time arbitrage” is often a function of merely
thinking nonlinearly.
My former PM had a term
-
“data point extrapolation”
-
that he used to describe the behavior of many analysts, buy
-
side and sell
-
side alike: take the most recent two data points, draw a line through ‘em, and that’s your
forecast.
Wh
ile this works well enough much of the time, occasionally, there are situations where it is
fairly obvious that there will be a big nonlinear change in results at some point over the medium term
-
yet the market often fails to price this, overl
y focusing o
n near
-
term trends.
Sometimes, stuff doesn’t matter until it’s all that matters
-
critical thresholds
.
There’s a fun story in
Richard Rhodes’
“
The Making of the
Atomic Bomb
”
(
TMAB review + notes
)
about how merely moving
your finger an unnoticeable fraction of an inch can be eno
ugh to turn an unreactive pile of uranium
into a nuclear chain reaction that could level a city.
In a ZIRP environment with easy terms, it’s insane how many investors started to classify LBO
-
style
balance sheets
-
i.e., 4
-
5x EBITDA
-
as “reasonable” or
even “strong,” suggesting that shares of
these companies deserved to trade at premium P/E multiples as if the debt didn’t exist.
Being aware
of these sorts of potential critical thresholds, when the market is blase, can help steer us away from
disaster.
M
any lessons are in the “still learning” rather than “fully learned” camp, and this is one of them: try as I
might, I still find myself needing to think less linearly than I do.
2018
-
10
-
24
–
Askeladden
Q3
’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
15
Investing Lesson 5: All In Ain’t Alright
M
ental models:
mindfulness
,
sleep
,
schema
,
dose
-
dependency
“I’m not afraid of being punched in the face... just the seconds before, ‘cuz I hate that I can’t see the future.”
-
Handguns, “
Queens
”
Continuing with the idea of nonlinearity, here’s a profoundly important concept that many intell
igent people
-
including me
-
take far too long to grasp.
If one is good and two is better, that doesn’t mean the relationship
continues like that forever.
A practical example: one extra
-
strength Tylenol (500 mg acetaminophen / paracetamol) will help yo
ur
headache, two (1000 mg) will probably make you forget you ever had one.
But, under certain circumstances,
as few as ten (5,000 mg) could cause irreversible l
iver damage and even death.
8
This sort of “dose
-
dependency” relationship applies to many as
pects of life.
Nobody likes a granny driver
--
if you’re planning to go under the speed limit on the highway, don’t even bother getting in the right lane.
Just
straight up stop driving and call an Uber. On the other hand, if you routinely go 15
-
20+ mi
les over the
speed limit, I don’t want to be on the same highway as you... let alone in the passenger seat of your car.
Yet especially in the business and finance world, there’s a perverse fascination with the idea of “more is
better,” culminating in “grit,”
which is really dumb.
Pointing to football players and Navy SEALs as role
models is a little childish and ignores
selection bias
: yes, being totally devoted to some narrow task and
sacrificing everything to achieve it works for those ends, for people who
are cut out for that.
But it’s not how
the rest of us should live our lives in different circumstances.
I’ve railed against the grit nonsense before and elsewhere and don’t need to do it again here.
It’s important to
try hard
, of course
–
but it’s vastl
y
more important to utilize
structural problem solving
to put yourself in
the right position to maximize your output per unit of input.
Summarily, one man with a bulldozer can get
more done, with poor work ethic, than one man with a shovel and the best wo
rk ethic in the world.
(I’ve
previously and elsewhere discussed the importance of
sleep
, so I won’t do so here.)
Moreover, one man with
the
right blueprint
and the wrong attitude is going to make more progress than another man with the
wrong
blueprint
an
d right attitude.
(See Covey on
the right map of Chicago
.)
More interesting is the business and emotional angle: while there’s often a fascination with “total alignment”
-
i.e. managers who invest their entire net worth in their strategy, and whose fees
are solely performance
based
-
it’s a profoundly idiotic ideal, because it completely ignores dose
-
dependency and
n
-
order impacts
.
Yes.
Managers should be aligned with their clients.
They should care about results. But investment CAGR
shouldn’t define t
heir identity.
In fact, I believe it’s important that it doesn’t: strong emotions (both positive
and negative) affect decisionmaking.
Overconfidence and arrogance during good times are as dangerous as
desperation (or tail
-
tucking) during bad times.
To av
oid emotions
-
and, consequently, portfolio decisions
-
being inappropriately driven by market whims,
it’s important for an investor to have enough detachment to actively dampen the emotional vol rather than
getting sucked into a
feedback
-
driven vortex of
bad decisions compounding bad ones.
8
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2659888/
Single doses of more than 150 mg/kg or 7.5 g in adults have been considered potentially toxic, altho
ugh the minimal dose associated with liver injury
ca
n range anywhere from 4 to 10 g
.
2018
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Q3
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Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
16
This involves both
margin of safety
from a financial perspective (i.e., not having to worry about paying your
bills if the market implodes), and from an emotional perspective. Taking these in turn:
First, p
erformance
-
onl
y fee structures are bad for client and manager alike.
While they sound nice in theory,
the practical reality is that correlations go to 1 in any sufficiently panicky selloff, and it really doesn’t matter
what you own
-
any market exposure, no matter how
resilient and undervalued, will get clobbered on a mark
-
to
-
market basis.
It’s difficult to focus on making good investment decisions when you’re worried about
where your next mortgage payment is coming from; as such, it’s not optimal from a behavioral sta
ndpoint for
managers’ personal cash flow to be tied to the vicissitudes of mar
ket performance.
Similarly,
second,
overinvestment by managers in their own fund is likely suboptimal.
Clients don’t, and
shouldn’t, have the majority of their net worth investe
d in any one fund
-
so their interests are not necessarily
aligned with that of a manager who has all, or a substantial majority, of their net worth invested in the
fund.
This may lead to inappropriately risk
-
averse decisionmaking at exactly the times whe
n the manager
should be the most aggressive
-
for
example, during deep selloffs.
Third, i
n sports and investing alike, “love of the game’ is often lauded to the extent that it’s encouraged, or
expected, for this love to consume your entire life.
Players a
re criticized for having (or having the appearance
of, or
merely wanting) a life
more diverse than just their chosen profession 24/7.
It’s quite possible, however, to love someone or something and yet not want to spend
all
of your time with it
-
you can p
robably name a couple friends and family to whom this applies.
More pertinently to investing, one
of the most critical attributes an investor can have is objectivity: the ability to step back and accurately assess
mistakes.
And so the problem with confla
ting your entire identity or self
-
worth with your investment track record,
AUM level, process, reputation, or what have you, is that to the extent some part of that investment approach
or structure is broken, you need to be able to step back and identify a
nd fix the mistake.
It is very difficult
-
sometimes impossible
-
to do this if your identity is exclusively tied up in it, because then
you’re
the mistake.
The phrase “can’t see the forest for the trees” is literal
-
on a recent backpacking trip to the
remote
Northwoods of Minnesota, I very literally couldn’t, at times, see the forest, because I was in the middle of so
many trees.
Trees are actually kind of boring up close: it’s only when you get a ridge, a lake, a meadow, or
some other kind of break/op
ening that you have the space to see the beauty.
To this end, at least three investment managers in their 40s and 50s have discussed with me the challenges
they’ve faced with issues related to being “too close” to their business, ranging from burnout /
reduced
productivity to being too slow to catch mistakes.
Being “all in” sounds good
-
but it’s not, because it leads to
commitment bias
and
sunk
-
cost
thinking.
Something
-
anything
-
to avoid this is helpful.
One of those managers I referenced took up
drumming.
One
of them devotes a lot of time to exercise, and liked to take his dogs for a walk when he got home from work
-
“they don’t care if you had a bad day at the office.
They don’t care if your clients are leaving, if the market’s down.
They don’
t
remember the last walk and they aren’t worried about the next walk.
This walk, right now, is the best thing that’s ever
happened to them.”
This is, it seems, one of the lessons typically learned later rather than earlier
-
which is why I like to surrou
nd
myself with people a lot older (err, more experienced) than myself, so I can learn by proxy.
2018
-
10
-
24
–
Askeladden
Q3
’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
17
I try as best I can to craft an identity that allows me to have a little separation from the vicissitudes of the
market.
I am a nice person.
I have 4
-
5 close
family and friends relationships that I invest a lot in.
Puppies
and children think I’m cool. I’m a writer, and
over the past year,
I’ve become a legitimately good cook. And
I’m (moderately) adventurous: I like going on road trips that involve backpack
ing and other fun outdoor
activities.
Of course, one of the challenges here is the
local vs. global optimization
problem engendered by optics:
what’s optimal isn’t always optically pleasant for clients to see.
This goes back to Lesson 2 (Begin With The
En
d In Mind)
-
cultivating the right sort of client base is as important as cultivating the right sort of
investment approach and process.
Conclusions
The nearly 20 pages’ worth
of lessons presented here are far from all I’ve learned in 5 years of professio
nal
investing.
There’s much, much more.
But
what I’ve discussed represents s
ome of the most critical
-
and
counterintu
itive
-
takeaways
. Cumulatively, they’ve helped me dramatically boost the quantity and quality of
my research output, as well as my abi
lity to appropriately manage portfolio positions.
Where to next?
These lessons have some logical conclusions on the evolution of Askeladden as a business
and investment process.
More specifics to follow in the year
-
end letter, which will reflect on Ask
eladden’s
first three years of existence
-
and our plans for the next three.
Westward on,
Samir
2018
-
10
-
24
–
Askeladden
Q3
’18:
Five Counterintuitive Lessons from Five Years of Professional Investing
askeladdencapital.com
18
Appendix
DISCLAIMER: Data is estimated, unaudited, and provided fo
r directional color only. Past performance is
not a predictor of future results. We do not expect our future returns to approximate our historical returns.
Amounts may differ due to rounding. Please consult your monthly statements from Fund Associates LLC
or
audited annual financials from Spicer Jeffries LLP for actual returns. Decimal points have been excluded so as
not to convey a level of precision that these estimates are not intended to convey.
Net returns are calculated assuming a hypothetical invest
or paid the standard fee structure of a 1.5% annual
management fee and 30% of the outperformance, if any, vs. the S&P 1000 Total Return index,
which was
chosen because it had, at the time of inception,
historically outperformed the Russell 2000 and most
ac
curately represents our typical investment universe of small and mid
-
capitalization U.S. equities (i.e., those
with a market cap of $10 billion or less). We may invest outside this universe (for example, in U.S. large caps
or international small caps.)
In
dividual investors' returns may differ from those presented here due to their date of entry into the fund or
their specific fee structure (for example, accredited but non
-
qualified clients may not, by law, be charged a
performance allocation, so they are t
ypically charged a higher, flat management fee).
Results are presented only for Askeladden Capital Partners LP and not for any of the separately managed
accounts which Askeladden Capital Management LLC (the investment advisor to Askeladden Capital Partner
s
LP) also oversees. While separately managed accouts are generally allocated very similarly to the fund, SMA
clients' performance may differ based on factors such as: timing of account opening, tax considerations,
specific client instructions, and manager
discretion; therefore, SMA clients should consult their Interactive
Brokers statements for specific performance information for their account.
This is not an offering of securities or solicitation thereof; any offering of securities would only be made to
accredited investors via a Private Placement Memorandum under Rule 506(c) of Regulation D, and any
prospective partners who did not have a pre
-
existing relationship with Askeladden as of 1/18/2017 would be
required to verify their accredited status with r
elevant documentation. This requirement does not apply to
separately managed accounts.
Any documents prepared prior to 2017
-
01
-
18 were not intended for public distribution and should be read
accordingly. Askeladden Capital Partners, and SMAs that mirror i
ts strategy, should be considered high
-
risk
investments suitable for only a small portion of an investor's overall portfolio, as they involve the risk of loss,
including total loss. Specific risk factors
are enumerated in our Form ADV.
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